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Mr. Aragon's injury which occurred approximately three years and
four months prior to the effective date of the legislation?
C.

If

the

Utah

Product

Liability

Act

limitation

requires knowledge of the identity of the manufacturer as well as
the fact of injury caused by a product, did Mr. Aragon file his
claim within two years of the time he should have known of Casa
Herrera's identity?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law.

An

appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions, reviewing them for correctness.
813

P.2d

1156,

1159

(Utah

1991).

Rollins v. Petersen,

However, even

if the

trial

court's legal conclusions are erroneous, this Court may affirm the
trial court on any proper legal basis.

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,

770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutes determinative of the issues are Utah Code
§ 78-12-25(3) and Utah Code § 78-15-1 et seq. which are reproduced
in their entirety in Appendices B and C respectively.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case.
This is a product liability action brought by Mr. Aragon

seeking

damages

for injuries to his arm allegedly

mixing machine manufactured by Casa Herrera, Inc.

2

caused by a

B.

Course of Proceedings.
Aragon originally
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.

Procedure.

court

"'
^: • •
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.ilmg
3

' - - pursuant
.earing on
dated

October

'il^ - . .,__
I-9L

affirming

its previous grant of summary judgment.

The trial court executed

(Appendix E)

its formal order on November 13, 1991.

(Appendix F)
Aragon filed his notice of appeal on December 13, 1991.
(Appendix G)

The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this

Court by order dated February 19, 1992.
C.

(Appendix A)

Statement of Facts.
Insofar

against

Casa

as

they

Herrera,

the

are

material

facts

as

to

Mr.

asserted

by

Aragon's
Aragon

claims
are

as

follows:
1.

Facts Regarding Accident.

Mr. Aragon commenced working

for Clover Club Foods on

(Letter of Aragon7s counsel dated October 5,

December 3, 1985.
1989—Appendix H)

On December 12, 1985, he was operating a dough

mixing machine (sometimes referred to as a masa feeder).

(Ibid.)

At approximately 4:15 p.m., he shut the mixer off, but his supervisor

subsequently

directed

him

to clean the machine.

(Ibid.)

Aragon re-started the feeder, let it run for several minutes, and
then

started

to

climb

three

steps

next

to the mixer with

intention of looking into the top of the machine.

(Ibid.)

the

As he

mounted the steps, Aragon slipped on some grease and, while attempting to steady himself, grabbed the edge of the feeder.

(Ibid.)

A paddle swept his arm into the machine, injuring his left arm and
hand.

(Ibid.)

4

2.

Identification of the Mixer's
Manufacturer and Filing Against
Casa Herrera.

Aragon's

first attempt to identify the manufacturer of

the machine was his counsel's letter to Clover Club Foods and/or
Borden, Inc. in October, 1989.

(Appendix H)

When Clover Club did not respond, Aragon filed an action
against Clover Club and Borden in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah on November 10, 1989.
Johnson, Appendix

I)

(Affidavit of Paul

Aragon filed his first discovery

requests

seeking the identity of the machine's manufacturer on January 11,
1990—approximately
(Ibid.)

four years and one month after the accident.

The district court dismissed the federal action for lack

of diversity on April 20, 1990, and Aragon refiled the complaint in
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County on May 11, 1990.
(Ibid.)

On July 13, 1990, Clover Club and Borden identified Casa

Herrera as the machine's manufacturer.

(Ibid.)

Aragon filed his

action against Casa Herrera in or about October, 1990.

(Ibid.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Aragon argues that the two year limitation of the Utah
Product Liability Act, effective April 24, 1989, governs his claims
against Casa Herrera and that the limitation period commenced on
July

13,

1990,

the

discovery requests.

date

Clover

Club

and

Borden

answered

his

Aragon must convince the Court that the Utah

Product Liability Act limitation does not commence when a plaintiff
becomes aware of an injury caused by a product—terms
stated

in the statute—but

only when the plaintiff
5

expressly

additionally

acquires knowledge of the manufacturer's identity, a term Aragon
petitions the Court to imply in the statute.

Aragon's contentions

are ill-founded on two bases.
This
determine

the

ascertaining
statute

is

Court's

function

legislature's
this

used

intent

interpreting

intent.

that

advisedly,

in

The

(1) the

statutes

Court

should

language

(2) omissions

are

is to

note

employed

in

in

a

significant,

and

(3) words are to be given their natural and accepted meaning.

In

light of these criteria, the express language of the statute can
only be interpreted to mean that the commencement of the limitation
period is conditioned on two factors—knowledge of injury caused by
a product.
The

history

of

the Utah

Product

Liability

Act demon-

strates that the Utah Legislature intended to restrict rather than
broaden a plaintiff's rights in a product liability action.
intent

contrasts

markedly

with

the

intent

of

the

Legislature as determined by the Washington courts.

This

Washington
Accordingly,

the Orear decision cited by Aragon is distinguishable.
The Court should not imply a discovery term in light of
the circumstances here since by due diligence Aragon could have
learned Casa Herrera's identity in a timely fashion.
Because commencement of the Utah Product Liability Act
limitation period is not conditioned on knowledge of the manufacturer's identity, the Court cannot constitutionally

retroactively

apply the two year limitation from the date of Aragon's accident.
The Utah Legislature expressly provided that in the event that an
6

application of the limitation was invalid, the provision would not
govern.

Accordingly,

Utah

Code

§ 78-12-25(3),

the

four

year

limitation period, applies and bars Aragon's claims.
In the event that the Court determines that commencement
of the Utah

Product

Liability Act

knowledge of the manufacturer's
uphold the trial court.
claimant

knows

or

limitation

is conditioned on

identity, the Court should still

The limitation period commences when a

should

have known

the requisite

information.

Even if this Court allowed Aragon a period equal to the length of
the limitation to obtain the information, Aragon7s action against
Casa Herrera was still untimely.
ARGUMENT
I.

ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITATION IS
CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT.

A.
This Court's Duty Is to Determine the Legislature's Intent
When Interpreting the Phrase "Both the Harm and Its Cause."
Utah Code § 78-15-3 states:
A civil action under this chapter shall be
brought within two years from the time the
individual who would be the claimant in such
action discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, both the harm
and its cause. [Emphasis added.]
According to Aragon, the two year limitation commenced once he knew
of

the harm,

the

cause

machine's manufacturer.
on

decisions

Aragon
statute

of

the

of the harm,

and

the

identity

of

the

In reaching this conclusion, Aragon relies
Arizona

and

Washington

appellate

courts.

ignores the fact that the limitation at issue is a Utah
and

that

the

Arizona

and
7

Washington

courts

were

not

interpreting this statute when they reached their conclusions.

The

Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that:
The fundamental consideration which transcends
all others in regard to the interpretation and
application of a statute is:
What was the
intent of the legislature?
Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 411 P.2d 831, 832, 17 Utah 2d 337
(1966) .

Thus,

this

Court's

duty

is not to

rely

on

decisions

interpreting other states' statutes but to determine what the Utah
Legislature meant when it enacted the two year limitation containing the phrase "both the harm and its cause.11
B.
The Utah Supreme Court Has Established the Criteria Which this
Court Should Employ to Interpret the Limitation.
In interpreting the statute, the Court (1) must presume
that each term was used advisedly
School
1983));
Copper

(Board of Education of Granite

District v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d

1030, 1035

(2) should note omissions and give them effect
Corp.

(1973)); and

v.

Anderson,

514

P.2d

217,

219,

(Utah

(Kennecott

30 Utah

2d

102

(3) interpret each term in accord with its usually

accepted meaning (Hector, Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Association. 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987)).

Where the statutory language

is plain and unambiguous, the Court is to construe the statute
according to its plain language.

(Allisen v. American Legion of

Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988).
to

the

interpretation

of the two year

Applying these aids

limitation

conclusion that knowledge of the manufacturer's

leads to the

identity

is not

required before the two year limitation period starts to run.

8

1.

Each term used advisedly.

The limitations period starts to run when the injured
party discovers "both the harm and its cause."

Significantly, the

legislature used the word "both" to preface the elements necessary
to commence the limitation period.

As defined by Webster's Seventh

New Collegiate Dictionary, the term "both" means "the two: the one
and the other."
obviously

By using the word "both," the legislature was

referring

to only

two elements.

By contrast, Aragon

invites this Court to add a third element—the

identity of the

manufacturer.

when

The

word

"both"

is nonsensical

used

in a

context referring to three elements.
2.

Significance of Omissions.

As noted above, the Supreme Court not only presumes that
each term in a statute is used advisedly, but it also assumes that
omissions are significant.

Had the legislature intended to include

knowledge of the manufacturer's identity as an element required to
commence the limitation period, it would have expressly stated this
intention.
3.

Usually accepted meanings.

Neither Aragon nor Casa Herrera questions the meaning of
the term "harm."
"its

cause."

The dispute is over the meaning of the phrase

As commonly used

in a strict products

liability

action, the term "cause" refers to the connecting link between the
injury and the alleged defective condition of the product.

9

4•

Lack of ambiguity.

The language of the statute is unambiguous, and the Court
need go no further than to apply this statute according to its
terms,

i.e. the limitation period

in a product liability action

commences when the plaintiff is aware of the harm done and the fact
that a product caused that harm.
C.
Even If One Assumes That the Statute is Ambiguous, the Utah
Product Liability Act Reflects the Legislature's Intent to
Restrict, Rather than to Expand, a Manufacturer's Liability in a
Product Liability Action.
If a statute is susceptible to different interpretations,
the Court must choose the meaning which best harmonizes with the
legislative intent and purpose.
608 P. 2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980).
that

the

history

terms

of

the

two

Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty,
Even if this Court were to assume

year

limitation

are

ambiguous, the

and provisions of the Utah Product Liability Act demon-

strate the legislature's intent to restrict, rather than to expand,
an individual's opportunity to bring an action against a product
manufacturer.
The Utah

Manufacturers

Product Liability Act.
(Utah

1985).

limited

the

The

Association

sponsored

the

Utah

(Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 681

act

plaintiff's

included
right

action—(1) a statute of repose,

provisions
to

bring

which
a

significantly

product

liability

(2) a provision restricting the

plaintiff's right to include a specific figure in the plaintiff's
prayer

for

damages,

(3) definitions

10

of

the

terms

"defect"

and

"unreasonably dangerous," and (4) a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness if the product complied with government standards.
Although the Utah Supreme Court declared the entire Utah
Product Liability Act unconstitutional in Berry v. Beach Aircraft,
717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Utah Legislature resurrected the act
in 1989 by substituting the two year limitation statute for the
statute

of

repose

which

the

Supreme

Court

had

invalidated.

Obviously, the legislature's action in revitalizing the act bespoke
the

legislature's

intent

to

again

reimpose

limitations

on

a

plaintiff's right to bring an action against a product manufacturer.
the

Given this history, it is apparent that if the language of

limitation

is ambiguous, the

Court

must

adopt

the

meaning

consistent with the legislature's intent to restrict a plaintiff's
cause against a manufacturer.
D.
The Utah Legislature's Intent Is Clearly Distinguishable from
that of the Washington Legislature as Interpreted by the Washington
Courts.
Of
argument

all

that

the

the

cases

term

cited

"cause"

by

Aragon

includes

in

the

support
identity

of his
of

the

manufacturer, only one, Orear v. International Paint Co. , 796 P. 2d
759

(Wash.

App.

1990),

purports

to

interpret

a

statute

with

language similar—but not identical—to the Utah Product Liability
Act.

However, the issue of legislative intent sharply differen-

tiates the Washington statute from the Utah statute.
In Orear, the Washington Court of Appeals interpreted RCW
7.72.060(3) which provides that a product liability claim accrues
when "the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence
11

should have discovered the harm and its cause."

(As noted above,

the Utah statute prefaces the word "harm" with the word "both.")
The appellate court based its interpretation of the Washington act
on a previous Washington Supreme Court decision.

In that decision,

the supreme court had held that the term "cause" as used in the
statute was ambiguous and that it was appropriate to give the term
a liberal meaning since the Washington Legislature had expressly
declared that "its intent was to not unduly
right to recover."
Orear

had

statute

Orear, 796 P. 2d at 763.

determined

liberally,

impair a claimant's

it

that
held

it was
that

appropriate
the

identity

Once the court in
to
of

manufacturer was part of the "cause" of the harm.

interpret
the

the

product

Although the

Washington Legislature may have declared its intent not to impair a
claimant's right to recover, the same cannot be said of the Utah
Legislature.
E.
The More Restrictive Interpretation Achieves an Appropriate
Balance Between Competing Objectives.
In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court noted the primary objective of a limitation statute:
The governing policy in this area, as declared
by the United States Supreme Court, is that
statutes of limitations "are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
[Citing Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944)]
Myers, 635 P.2d 86.

Having stated the primary objective, the court

judicially imposed a discovery rule in view of the facts of that
12

case.

In reaching its decision, the court considered an Illinois

case and noted that in any situation requiring the discovery rule,
a balancing of interests is necessary:
This application of the discovery rule was
apparently based on a balancing test.
The
hardship the statute of limitations would
impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances of
that case outweighed any prejudice to the
defendant from difficulties of proof caused by
the passage of time.
Myers, 635 P.2d 87.
In

the

balance has been

case

of

struck

the

as

Utah

Product

follows.

Liability

Act,

the

The period begins when a

person is aware he or she has been injured and is aware that a
product

has

caused

the

injury.

This

measure

accommodates

the

interest of a person with a latent injury which may not manifest
itself immediately or the interest of an individual who is aware of
an

injury

but

is not

source of that injury.

immediately

aware that a product was the

Accordingly, until the individual is aware

of the harm and its source, the manufacturer's interest is put in
abeyance.

However, once the injured person is on notice that he or

she must act to pursue a remedy, the law protects the manufacturer's interest in not having to defend stale claims.
The

Illinois

Appellate

Court

has

well

expressed

the

reasons why knowledge of the identity of a tort feasor is not a
factor in the balancing of these interests.
381 N.E.2d

1164

(111. App. 1978),

In Guebard v. Jabaav,

the plaintiff

had brought a

malpractice action against his personal physician and a hospital,
claiming that the physician had negligently performed surgery on
13

his knee.
expired

The plaintiff learned after the limitation period had

that

surgery•

a

resident

physician

had

actually

performed

the

Plaintiff amended his complaint to include the resident,

and the resident physician obtained summary judgment.

On appeal,

the plaintiff claimed that the discovery rule permitted the late
amendment of his complaint.

In refuting these contentions, the

Illinois court stated:
In applying the discovery rule, the court will
balance the hardship on the plaintiff caused by
the bar of his suit against the increased
burden of a defendant to obtain proof of his
defense after the passage of time.
The
hardship imposed upon a party who is unaware he
had an actionable injury until after the
limitations period has run is much more severe
than that imposed upon a party who knows, or
reasonably should know, he has suffered an
actionable injury but does not learn the
identity of the person who injured him until
after the limitations period has passed.
The
former is in no position to take advantage of
the limitations period in which to determine
the identity of the party injuring him.
The
latter, however, knows he has a cause of
action, has the time given by the limitations
period to attempt to learn the identity of the
person who injured him and is not in the
position of being barred before ever knowing of
his right to sue. We find no basis upon which
the extension of the discovery rule urged by
plaintiff could be applied in this case.
[Emphasis added.]
Guebard. 381 N.E.2d 1167.
The

Massachusetts

Appellate

Court

reached

a

similar

result in Krasnow v. Allen, 562 N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
In Krasnow,
against

a

a decedent's husband
psychiatrist

filed

who, unknown

employee of a public entity.

to

a wrongful death action
the

plaintiff,

was

an

After learning the identity of the
14

psychiatrist's

employer, the plaintiff

include the public entity.

amended

his complaint to

The amended complaint was dismissed due

to the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of his claim.
addressing
should

the

postpone

plaintiff's
the

contention

commencement

that

of the

the

discovery

limitation

period,

In
rule
the

Massachusetts court stated:
Determining how far to extend the discovery
rule requires a balancing between competing
policies: the policy of fairness to claimants
who may have incomplete knowledge of the facts
giving rise to their claim, which underlies the
discovery rule; and the policies of repose and
fairness to defendants, who may be disadvantaged by delay in defending themselves, which
underlie time limitations on litigation. That
balance seems to have been struck in Massachusetts in favor of a somewhat more limited
discovery rule than exists in many other
jurisdictions.
In light of that reality, as
well as the federal guidance, we decline to
extend the rule to the facts of this case. The
plaintiff knew of the harm and of Dr. Allen's
likely causal involvement in October of 1979.
From then on the claim against Dr. Allen's
public employer, assuming Dr. Allen could be
found to be a Commonwealth employee, was not
inherently
unknowable.
The
plaintiff's
knowledge was sufficient to stimulate further
inquiry on his part about the claim, including
inquiry into the facts about Dr. Allen's
employment status, and, thus, to start the
running of the clock. [Citations omitted.]
Krasnow, 562 N.E.2d 1380.
It is apparent why the Utah Legislature would not include
notice of the manufacturer's identity as an element necessary to
commence

the

diligence.

limitation

period.

A

limitation

statute

requires

Once a person is on notice that he or she has been

injured and that a product has caused the injury, it is the injured

15

person's

burden

to

diligently

search

for

the

identity

of

the

manufacturer and file his action before the evidence grows stale.
II.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO MANDATE A
COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT THAT A LIMITATION BE
TOLLED UNTIL A PLAINTIFF KNOWS THE IDENTITY OF
A PRODUCT'S MANUFACTURER.
As discussed in Point I, the Utah Product Liability Act

limitation does not include the condition Aragon seeks.

There is

no reason for this Court to imply such a condition as a matter of
common law.
In Becton Dickinson and Company v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court restated the basic rule regarding limitation statutes and listed those circumstances justifying
the "discovery rule:11
The policy heretofore adopted by this Court is
that statutes of limitations "are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
To further that policy, the general rule has
been that a cause of action accrues upon the
happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action.
Under that
general rule, "mere ignorance of the existence
of a cause of action does not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations."
There are several exceptions to this general
rule in Utah.
In some areas of the law, the
discovery rule is incorporated into the statute
whereby the statute does not begin to run until
the facts forming the basis for the cause of
action are discovered. In other circumstances,
concealment or misleading by a party prevents
that party from relying on the statute of
limitations.
Finally, where there are exceptional circumstances that would make application of the general rule irrational or unjust,
16

this Court has adopted the discovery rule by
judicial action. [Citations omitted.]
Becton Dickinson, 668 P. 2d at 1257.
general

rule

are

(3) inequity.

(1) statutory

The three exceptions to the

mandate,

(2) concealment,

and

As discussed above, the Utah Product Liability Act

does not require knowledge of the manufacturer's identity.

Under

the circumstances of this case, Aragon cannot resort to the other
two exceptions for a common law tolling of the limitation period.
Becton

Dickinson

provides

guidance

as

to

when

concealment

or

injustice would call for application of the discovery rule.
A.
Concealment Does Not Provide a Basis for Requiring Knowledge
of the Manufacturer's Identity.
In Becton Dickinson, Reese, the defendant, had filed a
counterclaim
patent

against

rights,

Becton

asserting

Dickinson,

that

Becton

the

assignee

Dickinson

deprived Reese of benefits under the patent.
predecessor
inventor.

had

filed

the

patent

without

of

had

certain

unlawfully

Becton Dickinson's
naming

Reese

as

an

When Becton Dickinson asserted the applicable limitation

statute as an affirmative defense, Reese sought protection under
the discovery rule.
Although
concealed

Becton

from Reese the

Dickinson's

predecessor

had

allegedly

fact that Reese was not named on the

patent, the supreme court nonetheless rejected application of the
discovery rule as to Becton Dickinson, stating:
Nor is this case premised on concealment of
necessary facts or misleading of the defendant
by the plaintiff. [Emphasis by the court.]
*

*
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*

Defendant makes no allegations Becton Dickinson
either concealed the details of the patent from
him or misled him in any way.
Becton Dickinson, 668 P. 2d at 1257 and fn. 13.

Here, even though

Clover Club and Borden delayed their responses to Aragon's inquiries for reasons known to them, their delay cannot be imputed to
Casa Herrera.
B.
Nothing in the Circumstances of This Case Constitutes Exceptional Circumstances Which Would Make Application of the General
Rule Irrational or Unjust.
The Utah

Supreme

Court has emphasized

the plaintiff's

duty to diligently pursue information relative to the claim.

In

Becton Dickinson, Reese claimed the discovery rule applied to his
situation since he was unaware he had been injured until he found
that his name had been omitted from the patent.

The supreme court

rejected the argument stating:
The patent here in question was issued on July
27, 1975, almost five years before defendant
filed his claim, and defendant admits he knew
the patent had issued.
In any event, due
diligence on his part would have unearthed the
inventor and his assignee as shown on the face
of the patent. [Emphasis added.]
Becton Dickinson, 668 P.2d

at 1257.

The thrust of the supreme

court's holding is clear—a claimant is duty-bound to ascertain the
facts when those facts are available.
If anything Reese's claim to equity in Becton Dickinson
was stronger than Aragon's position here.

In Becton Dickinson,

Reese claimed that he was unaware of the omission in the patent and
that there was nothing to put him on notice that he should review
18

the patent.

By contrast, Aragon was clearly on notice of his

injury and its cause as of the day of the accident.

Obviously, he

knew he would have to identify the machine's manufacturer before
filing an action.

Yet, he made no effort to obtain this informa-

tion for nearly three years and ten months.
are certainly not extraordinary.

The circumstances here

In light of the record, there is

no injustice in this Court refusing to toll the limitation until
Aragon discovered Casa Herrera's identity.
III.

THE UTAH LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY PROVIDED DIRECTION
REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE § 78-15-3
TO PERSONS IN ARAGON'S SITUATION.
Since Aragon is not entitled to a tolling of the limita-

tion based on his alleged ignorance of Casa Herrera's identity, the
next issue the Court must address is the limitation applicable to
Aragon7s

claims.

Casa

Herrera

maintains

that

the

four

year

limitation of Utah Code § 78-12-25 applies.
A.

Evolution of Utah Product Liability Act Time Limitation.
The

originally
repose

and

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

enacted, Utah Code § 78-15-3
not

a

Aircraft Corp. , 717

statute
P.2d

of
670

left

1985)

(See
and

Scandia of America, 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989)).
Court

declared

the

statute

doubt

that

when

(1977) was a statute of

limitation.
(Utah

no

Berry v. Beech

Raithaus v. SaabThe Utah Supreme

of repose unconstitutional

in Berry

v. Beech Aircraft, because the statute created a situation where a
persons right of action was extinguished before it arose.

In a

1989 response to Berry, the Utah Legislature repealed the statute
19

of repose and enacted the present two year statute, effective April
24, 1989.

See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 fn. 7 (Utah

1991).
B.
The Legislature, Aware That Some Applications of the Statute
Might Otherwise Be Unconstitutional, Declared Its Intent That the
Limitation Did Not Apply to Persons in Mr. Aragon's Position.
By its terms, the 1989 statute requires a plaintiff in a
products liability action to file his or her complaint within two
years after the plaintiff has discovered the harm and its cause.
If this statute were applied to Aragon according to its literal
terms, Aragon would have been required to file his complaint on or
before December 16, 1987, a date which occurred
Legislature enacted the statute.

long before the

The Utah Supreme Court stated in

Toronto v. Sheffield, 222 P.2d 594, 596, 118 Utah 460 (1950) that:
The Legislature may bar a claim within a
reasonable time within the effective date of a
statute enacted for the purpose, but may not
constitutionally bar such claim without allowing some time to elapse during which claimant
may bring an action thereon after the effective
date of the statute.
The legislature foresaw possible constitutional problems with the
statute's

implementation

and

took

measures

to

obviate

the

difficulties.
Section

4

of

the

1989

legislation

amending

Product Liability Act states:
If any provision of this Act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstancef is held invalid, the remainder of this
Act is given effect without the invalid
provision or application. [Emphasis added.]

20

the

Utah

Chapter

119

of

the

Laws

of

Utah

1989.

The

legislature

thus

provided that the limitation would not be applied to persons whose
rights would be cut off on a date prior to implementation of the
statute•

These persons were to be treated as though the limitation

had not been enacted, and their claims would continue to be subject
to the limitation governing the action prior to passage of the
legislation.
On the date of the accident, the general four year limitation of Utah Code § 78-12-25(3) governed Aragon's claims.

The

legislative action nearly three and one-half years later had no
effect on Aragon's claims.

He had a full four years to file his

action and his failure to timely file bars his claims against Casa
Herrera.
IV.

EVEN IF THIS COURT ACCEPTS ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT LIMITATION, HIS
CLAIM IS NONETHELESS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
This Court has heretofore noted that it may affirm the

trial court "if the trial court's decision can be sustained on any
proper legal basis."

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) .

Even if this Court were to interpret the

Utah

Act

Product

manufacturer's

Liability

limitation

as

including

the product

identity, the Court should nonetheless affirm the

trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Aragon maintains that he had two years from the time he
actually discovered

Casa Herrera's

identity to file the action.

Yet, the limitation states that a claimant has two years from the
time the claimant discovered

"or in the exercise of reasonable
21

diligence should have discovered" the requisite information.
undisputed

facts demonstrate

that Aragon

should

The

have discovered

Casa Herrera's identity long before he allegedly did.
In Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court considered a discovery limitation embodied in Utah
Code

§ 78-12-28(3)

plaintiff's

(1953).

The

claims were barred

supreme

court

as a matter

of

held

that

the

law despite

the

plaintiff's assertion that she was entitled to a trial to determine
when she should have known of her cause of action.

In response to

the plaintiffs' argument, the Utah Supreme Court noted:
The statute therefore permits an independent
trial on the limitation issue. It is, however,
like all other issues, subject to summary
judgment if no genuine issues of material fact
are raised.
Reiser, 641 P. 2d at 99-100.

Here, because the material facts are

not in dispute, this Court can determine as a matter of law that
even under Aragon's interpretation of the Utah Product Liability
Act limitation, Aragon did not timely file his complaint against
Casa Herrera.
Aragon's problem does not actually arise from any difficulty in obtaining Casa Herrera's identity.
once

he

initiated

his

within eight months.

inquiry, Aragon

It is undisputed that

acquired

the

information

Aragon's problem arises from his failure to

start the search for nearly three years and ten months after the
accident.
Casa

Surely, with due diligence, Aragon should have known of

Herrera's

identity

within

two years after the

period equivalent to the limitation itself.
22

accident—a

Even if the Court were

to grant Aragon a two-year discovery period as well as the two year
limitation

period

(a

total

of

four

years)

Aragon's

complaint

against Casa Herrera was untimely by ten months.
CONCLUSION
Aragon's construction of the Utah Product Liability Act
limitation

is

untenable,

because

it

does

not

accord

with

the

legislature's intent as manifested by the statutory language and
legislative history.

Furthermore, the circumstances of this care

are such that the Court should not imply a common law requirement
that the

statute be tolled

manufacturer.
§ 78-12-25

until Aragon

identified

the product

Hence, it is the four year limitation of Utah Code

which

applies

to

this

action.

Notwithstanding

the

foregoing, even if the Court were to determine that the identity of
the manufacturer is a necessary prerequisite to the commencement of
the

limitation,

Aragon's

lack

of

due

diligence

action against Casa Herrera as a matter of law.
Herrera

respectfully

requests

this

Court

to

precludes

this

Accordingly, Casa
affirm

the

trial

court's grant of summary judgment.
DATED this o?7 ~ day of April, 1992.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

Jay E. Jensen
M. Douglas Bayly
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Casa Herrera, Inc.
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four true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE CASA HERRERA
INC. were mailed, postage prepaid, to each of the following:
Douglas M. Durbano
Paul H. Johnson
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200
Ogden, UT 844 03
Allan T. Brinkerhoff
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main, #400
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APPENDIX A

February 19, 1992 Order

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

FEB 2 0 1992

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
February 19, 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
M. Douglas Bayly
Jay E. Jensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
175 South West Temple
Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

James M. Aragon,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Clover Club Foods Company, a Utah
corporation; Borden, Inc., a New
Jersey corporation, Casa Herrerra,
Inc., a California corporation,
and John Does I thru X, inclusive,
Defendants and Appellees.

No.

910553

900747717PI

Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

APPENDIX B

U t a h Code § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 ( 3 )

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-25

78-12-24. Actions against public officers — Within six
years.
An action by the state or any agency or public corporation thereof against
any public officer for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or
against any surety upon his official bond may be brought within six years
after such officer ceases to hold his office, but not thereafter.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-24.
Cross-References. — Governmental Immunity Act, ^ 63-30-1 et seq.

Misconduct by public servants, §§ 76-8-201
et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 54 C J S. Limitations of Actions
§ 33 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=»
58(2)

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Title 25, Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted Subsection (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as

Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsection (1).
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Assigned cause of action.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Conflict of laws.
Damage of private property for public use
Divorce actions.
Excessive freight charges.
Extension of period.

Federal civil rights actions.
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Judgment hen.
Land contract.
Malpractice.
Mortgages.
Nuisances.
Open account.
Oral contract.
Oral modification of written contract.
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APPENDIX C

Utah Code § 78-15-1 e t s e q .

78-14a-101

JUDICIAL CODE

78-14a-101.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter, "therapist" means:
(1) a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine under Sections 58-12-26
through 58-12-43, the Utah Medical Practice Act;
(2) a psychologist licensed to practice psychology under Title 58, Chapter 25a;
(3) a marriage and family therapist licensed to practice marriage and
family therapy under Title 58, Chapter 39;
(4) a social worker licensed to practice social work under Title 58,
Chapter 35; and
(5) a psychiatric and mental health nurse specialist licensed to practice
advanced psychiatric nursing under Title 58, Chapter 31.
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-101, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 42, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted "Sections 58-12-26 through 58-12-43" for "Chapter

12, Title 58" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter
25a" for "Chapter 25" in Subsection (2).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to warn.
(1) A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client
or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence
against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall
be discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the
threat to the victim, and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the
threat.
(2) No cause of action arises against a therapist for breach of trust or privilege, or for disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist's communication of information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty in
accordance with Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not limit or effect a therapist's duty to report child
abuse or neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4-503.
History: C. 1953, 78-14a-102, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 89, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 89 be-

came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 15
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
Section
78-15-1.
78-15-2.
78-15-3.
78-15-4.
78-15-5.

Section
Short title of act.
Repealed.
Statute of limitations.
Prayer for damages.
Alteration or modification of
product after sale as substan-

78-15-6.
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tial contributing cause — Manufacturer or seller not liable.
Defect or defective condition making product unreasonably dangerous — Rebuttable presumption.

PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT

78-15-1

78-15-1. Short title of act.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Product Liability
Act."
Historv: C. 1953, 78-15-1, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 1.
M e a n i n g of "this act." — The phrase this

act" means Laws 1977, ch. 149, which enacted
this chapter.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
The Utah Product Liability Act is unconstitutional. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft

Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (but see note
under this catchline following § 78-15-3).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — The Utah Product
Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing Concerns, 1979 Utah L.
Rev. 149.
Strict Products Liability in Utah Following
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 1980
Utah L. Rev. 577.
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev.
3.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. 495, 496.
Mulherin v. Ingersolh Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability
Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Used
Products and Strict Liability: A Practical Approach to a Complex Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 154.
The Merger of Comparative Fault Principles
with Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964.
A.L.R. — Handgun manufacturer's or
seller's liability for injuries caused to another
by use of gun in committing crime, 44
A.L.R.4th 595.
Products liability: construction materials or
insulation
containing
formaldehyde,
45
A.L.R.4th 751.
Products liability: liability of manufacturer
or seller as affected by failure of subsequent
party in distribution chain to remedy or warn
against defect of which he knew, 45 A.L.R.4th
777.
Products liability: perfumes, colognes, or
deodorants, 46 A.L.R.4th 1197.
Products liability: admissibility of defendant's evidence of industry custom or practice
in strict liability action, 47 A.L.R.4th 621.
Future disease or condition, or anxiety relating thereto, as element of recovery, 50
A.L.R.4th 13.

Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning athletic, exercise, or recreational
equipment, 50 A.L.R.4th 1226.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th
1186.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning wearing apparel, 52 A.L.R.4th 276.
Attorneys' fees in products liability suits, 53
A.L.R.4th 414.
Products liability: personal soap, 54
A.L.R.4th 574.
Duty and liability of subcontractor to employee of another contractor using equipment
or apparatus of former, 55 A.L.R.4th 725.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions, concerning electrical generation and transmission
equipment, 55 A.L.R.4th 1010.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning lawnmowers, 55 A.L.R.4th 1062.
Products liability: pertussis vaccine manufacturers, 57 A.L.R.4th 911.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning food, drugs, and other products intended for ingestion, 58 A.L.R.4th 7.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning cosmetics and other personal care
products, 58 A.L.R.4th 40.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning paint, cleaners, or other chemicals, 58
A.L.R.4th 76.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
support product misuse defense in actions concerning gas and electric appliances, 58
A.L.R.4th 131.
Products liability: sufficiency of evidence to
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73-15-2,

78-15-4

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 119, § 3 repeals
; 78-15-2, as enacted by L. 1977, ch. 149, § 2,
containing legislative findings and declara-

tions and stating the purpose of the chapter,
effective April 24, 1989.

78-15-3. Statute of limitations.
A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the
time the individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or in
the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its
cause.
History: C. 1953, 78-15-3, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 119, § 1.
R e p e a l s and Reenactments. — Laws 1989,
ch. 119, ^ 1 repeals former § 78-15-3, as enacted by L. 1977, ch. 149, § 3, providing a stat-

ute of limitations, and enacts the present section, effective April 24, 1989.
Cross-References. — Effect of disability on
limitations generally, § 78-12-36.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Former statute.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Former section was held unconstitutional
and chapter invalid accordingly in Berry ex
rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985).

Former statute.
Six-year time period in former version of this
section was a statute of repose and could not
therefore function as a statute of limitations.
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of Am., Inc., 784
P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Whitehead v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When cause of action arises on action against manufacturer or seller of product
causing injury or death, 4 A.L.R.3d 821.
Running of statute of limitations on products
liability claim against manufacturer as affected by plaintiffs lack of knowledge of defect
allegedly causing personal injury or disease, 91
A.L.R.3d 991.
What statute of limitations applies to actions
for personal injuries based on breach of implied

warranty under UCC provisions governing
sales, 20 A.L.R.4th 915.
Validity and construction of statute terminating right of action for product-caused injury
at fixed period after manufacture, sale, or delivery, 25 A.L.R.4th 641.
Liability of auctioneer under doctrine of
strict products liability, 83 A.L.R.4th 1188.

78-15-4. Prayer for damages.
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a
product liability action against a product manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer. The complaint shall merely pray for such damages as are reasonable in
the premises.
History: C. 1953, 78-15-4, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 4.
Cross-References. — Claim in complaint of

interest on special damages in personal injury
action, § 78-27-44.
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78-15-5

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. — Allowance of punitive damages, 13
A.L.R.4th 52.
Consequential loss of profits from injury to

property as element of damages in products liability, 89 A.L.R.4th 11.

78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product after sale as
substantial contributing cause — Manufacturer
or seller not liable.
For purposes of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include an alteration or modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the manufacturer or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed the purpose,
use, function, design, or intended use or manner of use of the product from
that for which the product was originally designed, tested, or intended.
History: C. 1953, 78-15-5, e n a c t e d b y L.
1977, ch. 149, § 5; 1989, ch. 119, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted "For
purpose of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include" for "No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable for any injury, death or
damage to property sustained as a result of an
alleged defect, failure to warn or protect or failure to properly instruct, in the use or misuse of
that product, where a substantial contributing

cause of the injury, death or damage to property was" at the beginning of the section and
made minor stylistic changes.
Severability C l a u s e s . — Laws 1989, ch.
119, § 4 provides that if any provision of the
act, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the act is to be given effect without
the invalid provision or application.
Cross-References. — Comparative negligence, §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-38.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Alteration or modification required.
This section did not apply where there was
no alteration or modification of the product
which changed its purpose or use from that for
which it was designed. Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981).

This section requires some sort of physical
alteration or modification of the product itself
which leaves the product in a different condition or form than it was in when it left the
manufacturer's or seller's hands. Beacham v.
Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Statute precluding or limiting recovery where product has been altered or modified after leaving hands of manufacturer or
seller, 41 A.L.R.4th 47.
Alteration of product after it leaves hands of
manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for
product-caused harm, 41 A.L.R.4th 1251.
Products liability: product misuse defense,
65 A.L.R.4th 263.

Products liability: injury caused by product
as a result of being tampered with, 67
A.L.R.4th 964.
Liability for injury or death allegedly caused
by spoilage or contamination of beverage, 87
A.L.R.4th 804.
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78-15-6

78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making product unreasonably dangerous — Rebuttable presumption.
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage
allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in
the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer.
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in that
community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks,
dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer.
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any
defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in the plans or
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing,
inspecting and testing the product were in conformity with government
standards established for that industry which were in existence at the
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted.
History: C. 1953, 78-15-6, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 6.
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this

act" in Subsection (2) means Laws 1977, Chapter 149, which enacted this chapter

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Drugs.
A drug approved by the United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), properly prepared, compounded, packaged, and distributed,
cannot as a matter of law be "defective" in the
absence of proof of inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent information furnished
by the manufacturer in connection with FDA

approval. Grundberg v Upjohn Co , 813 P 2d
89 (Utah 1991)
A broad grant of immunity from strict liability claims based on design defects should be
extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs
in Utah. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P 2d 89
(Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Manufacturer's duty to test or inspect as affecting his liability for productcaused injury, 6 A L.R.3d 12.
Liability of owner or operator of self-service
laundry for personal injury or damages to patron or frequenter of premises from defect in
premises or appliances, 23 A.L.R.3d 1246.
Extension of strict liability in tort to permit
recovery by third person who was neither purchaser nor user of product, 33 A.L.R 3d 415.
Liability of product endorser or certifier for
product-caused injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 181.
Liability of owner or operator of motor vehi-

cle for injury, death, or property damage resulting from defective brakes, 40 A L R.3d 9
Liability of one selling or distributing liquid
or bottled fuel gas, for personal injury, death,
or property damage, 41 A L.R.3d 782.
Liability of manufacturer or seller of power
lawnmower for injuries to user, 41 A.L R.3d
986.
Necessity and sufficiency of identification of
defendant as manufacturer or seller of product
alleged to have caused injury, 51 A.L.R.3d
1344.
Failure to warn as basis of liability under

327

APPENDIX D
Memorandum Decision

AUS 0 5 1991

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES M. ARAGON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLOVER CLUB FOODS, et al.,
Defendants.

]
]|
]1
I
]
]

RULING ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 900747717

The defendants' motions for summary judgment came before the
Court on a notice to submit for decision.
The Court has
received written memoranda from the defendants in support of
their motions for summary judgment and from the plaintiff in
opposition. The plaintiff is represented by Douglas M. Durbano
and Paul H. Johnson and the defendants by Allan T. Brinkerhoff
and Steven W. Call for Clover Club Foods Company and Borden,
Inc., along with Jay E. Jensen for Casa Herrera, Inc.
Defendants7 two motions for summary judgment are granted.
There are no genuine issues of material fact in either motion.
The facts in the case are not complicated. Plaintiff James
M. Aragon, ("Aragon") began working for Clover Club Foods
Company
("Clover Club"),
a subsidiary
of Borden, Inc.
("Borden"), on December 3, 1985. Aragon was assigned to clean a
mesa feeder machine on his first day of work. Aragon cleaned
the mesa feeder machine each day from December 3, 1985, through
December 16, 1985. On December 16, 1985, Aragon began to clean
the mesa feeder. Aragon suffered a double compound fracture to
his left arm, having since undergone significant medical care
and treatment.
Aragon7s employers, Clover Club and Borden
relied on an insurance premium and Worker's Compensation to

cover Aragon's medical and disability expenses, Aragon sued his
employers, claiming that Borden is a third party tortfeasor who
acted negligently in supplying the mesa feeder machine to Clover
Club.
The issue in this case concerns whether defendants, Borden
and Clover Club were the common law employers of Aragon under
the Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 of the Worker's
Compensation Act on December 16, 1985.
If Clover Club and
Borden were the common law employers of Aragon on December 16,
1985, then Aragon7s exclusive remedy is confined to Worker's
Compensation. However, if Clover Club and Borden were not the
common law employers of Aragon on December 16, 1985, Aragon may
attempt to sue Clover Club or Borden as a third party tortfeasor
according to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62(a) of the
Worker's Compensation Act.
The Utah Supreme Court clarified the plain meaning of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 of the Worker's Compensation
Act, on back-to-back cases in 1989. In Pate v. Marathon Steel
Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
deemed the legislative language of Section 35-1-60 to be clear
and unequivocal. The language of Section 35-1-60 permits suits
by injured workers against statutory employers but not immediate
common law employers. Id. The Pate court defined a common law
employer as the on£ who actually pays the wages of the
employee. Id.
In the second case decided on the same date, Bosch v. Bursch
Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court further defined what constitutes a common law
employer.
A common law employer is required to pay the
employee's Worker's Compensation benefits.
Id. at 432.
An
employer who does not pay the employee's Worker's Compensation
benefits is deemed a statutory employer.
Id.
A statutory
employer who fails to pay the employee's Worker's Compensation

benefits is denied statutory immunity from an employee's suit as
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42(2) of the
Workers's Compensation Act,

Id.

The rule of law which clarifies Utah legislation in Pate and
Bosch

defines

a

common

law

employer

as

one

who

pays

employee's wages and Worker's Compensation benefits.

the

Applying

this common law employer rule to the facts in the instant case,
Clover Club and Borden constitute
December

17,

1985,

Aragon

a common

submitted

law employer.

his

initial

On

worker's

compensation claim to his employer's claims adjuster.

The claim

prepared by Aragon listed both defendants Clover Club and Borden
as his employers.

The insurance carrier which handles

claims

for Clover Club and Borden listed both Clover Club and Borden as
Aragon's

employers

in

filing

Industrial Commission on

an

answer

to

the

September 2, 1986.

Utah

State

Lastly, Aragon's

final compensation agreement approved by an administrative
judge

on

August

14,

1987,

both

for

Clover

the

Club

Utah

and

State

Borden

law

Industrial

Commission

listed

as

Aragon's

employers.

The administrative law judge ordered Clover Club and

Borden, as Aragon's employers, to pay disability wages of more
than

$16,000

Aragon.

and

Thus,

medical

for

expenses

having

paid

in

excess

Aragon's

wages

of

$45,000

and

Compensation benefits, both Clover Club and Borden

to

Worker's
constitute

the common law employers of Aragon.
Because

Clover

Club

employers, Aragon

and

is limited

Borden

are

Aragon's

common

to the exclusive remedy

law

of Utah

Code Annotated of the Worker's Compensation Act as provided for
in Section 35-1-60.

Since Aragon already has received wages and

medical expenses as his remedy from the Utah State Industrial
Commission,

no

continue

to

Borden,

would

factual

seek

issue

relief

preclude

from
a

remains.
his

To

permit

employers, Clover

finality

to

Aragon
Club

litigation.

to
and

More

significantly, plaintiff's employer is entitled to relief on the
basis of res judicata.

The matter already has been adjudicated.

Aragon, while conceding no genuine fact is materially
disputed, nonetheless argues that the undisputed facts are
subject to divergent interpretations. On the basis of such
divergent interpretations, the motion for summary judgment by
Clover Club and Borden, should be denied.
However, no
reasonable inference other than that Clover Club and Borden
acted as Aragon's common law employer can be drawn from the
facts. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Helgar Ranch,
Inc. v. Stillmen, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980), made clear
that a motion for summary judgment is denied only when a
material fact is genuinely controverted.
No facts in the
instant case are uncontroverted by either party. For example,
Aragon received a letter from Clover Club in May 20, 1987, that
contained an offer to buy health insurance from Borden.
Throughout the letter, Clover Club made clear that the insurance
offer came from Borden. This May 20, 1987, letter was supplied
by Aragon. Aragon kenw or had reason to know that both Clover
Club and Borden had acted as his employers.
The tangential question of piercing the corporate veil need
not be addressed. The Utah Supreme Court in Page and Bosch made
clear that the sole question on whether Clover Club or Borden
are third party tortfeasors or the employee's common law
employers turns on whether the defendants pay the employee's
wages and Worker's Compensation benefits. The facts in this
case clearly indicate that Clover Club and Borden are common law
employers and further actions by Aragon is barred. Thus, as a
matter of law, the motion for summary judgment, made by Clover
Club and Borden is granted.
Regarding the motion for summary judgment made by defendant,
Casa Herrera, Inc., the facts are uncontroverted. James Aragon
sustained a serious injury on December 16, 1985, while cleaning
a mesa feeder at Clover Club in Davis County. Aragon commenced

a cause of action against Casa Herrera on September 24, 1990.
In other words, Aragon did not exercise his right to seek a
remedy against Casa Herrera, Inc., until approximately four and
three-fourth years after he sustained serious injuries while
working at Clover Club.
The lapse of more than four years in filing a complaint
raises the question as to what statutory section governs the
commencing of a personal injury tort action. Aragon claims to
have six years to file from the date of purchase of the
allegedly defective machine or up to ten years from the date of
manufacture.
Aragon relies on Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-15-3 which in fact provided from six to ten years for filing
a complaint. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 727 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) found Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-15-3 to be a statute of repose. Id. at
672.
A statute of repose is per se unconstitutional for
violating
Article
I,
Section
11
of
the
Utah
State
Constitution.
Id.
The Berry court reasoned that Section
78-15-3 would deny a plaintiff a cause of action merely because
the plane which had crashed and caused the death of its
passengers was more than ten years old. Id. Any statute that
bars a plaintiff a cause of action without regard to when the
injury
occurs
is
a
statute
of
repose
and
hence
unconstitutional.
Id. at 679. Thus, Aragon may not use a
statute of repose as a basis for determining when his right of
action may toll.
Casa Herrera, Inc., correctly refers to Utah Code, Section
78-12-25 (1953 & Supp. 1975), for determining when a cause of
action tolls. Section 78-12-25, in effect in 1985, covers tort
actions for personal injuries and grants plaintiffs up to four
years to file a complaint with the courts. Section 78-12-25
meets the constitutional requirements set out by the Utah

Supreme Court

in Berry.

For, the

section takes

into account

when the injury occurs as a basis for determining how long a
plaintiff has to file a cause of action.
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its Berry litmus test for
determining

the constitutionality

of

statute

code

sections in

Riathaus v. Saab-Scandia of America, 789 P. 2d 1158, 1160 (Utah
1989) .

The Riathaus

prevent

plaintiffs

detriment

of

limitation,

court
from

how

sleeping

defendants.

Section

noted
Id.

78-12-25

at

statutes

on

their

1160.

As

of

limitations

rights
a

to

the

statute

of

gives

plaintiff

four

years

to

Riathaus

holdings

along

with

the

commence a cause of action.
Applying

the

Berry

and

proper code Section 78-12-25 to the

instant case, Aragon was

injured on Decmeber 16, 1985.

Aragon sued Casa Herrera, Inc.,

on

exceeds

September

24, 1990, which

approximately nine months.

the

statutory

limit by

Aragon's suit against defendant Casa

Herrera, Inc., is time barred.

As a matter of law, then Casa

Herrera, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is granted.
The defendants, Clover Club and Borden, are ordered to draw
a formal order based on this opinion.
Dated July 31, 1991.
x

BY THE COURT:

-

<s

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
Paul H. Johnson
Douglas M. Durbano
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200
Ogden, Utah 84403

Allan T. Brinkerhoff
Steven W. Call
310 So Main St, 12th Floor
SLC, Utah 84101

Jay E. Jensen
M. Douglas Bayly
175 So West Temple, Suite 510
SLC, Utah 84101
Dated this , X / ? d

day of August 1991,
'111
<a/•/,,,

Deputy Clerk

nJt)

APPENDIX E
October 22, 1991 Ruling
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ""' "° • ' °'IN AND FOR THE
...
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH ••
_

JAMES M. ARAGON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
CLOVER CLUB, et al.,

Defendants.

]
;I

RULING ON MOTION

;I

FOR RECONSIDERATION
Civil No. 900747717

]|

;

The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration came before th
Court for oral argument on October 22, 1991, with Douglas M
Durbano appearing for the plaintiff and M. Douglas Bayl
appearing for the defendant. After oral argument the Court too
the motion under advisement.
The defendant, Casa Herrera, presents two basic arguments
First, the Court should not grant a Rule 59 motion premised o
an argument which could and should have been presented at th<
initial hearing. Second, plaintiff's argument is contrary t<
the legislative intent in enacting the Utah Product Liabilit;
Act.
As to the first argument, this Court believes that a review
is at times more efficient than an appeal.
This Court has not been persuaded that it was wrong in it:
original ruling of July 31, 1991. The Court will, however
reflect further on the case.
The now products liability statute, Utah Code 78-15-3 limit!
actions to those "brought within two years from the time th<
individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered
or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, botl
the harm and its cause.11
In this case, James M. Aragoi
discovered both "the harm" and "its cause" on December 16, 1985

the day of the accident.

The harm was the injury to his ar^

The cause was the machine used by Clover Club Foods Compar.v
The plaintiff cited to the Court Qrear v. International Pa;Co. , 796

P.2d

756

(Wash.

App.

1990).

This

case

involved >

statute similar to the Utah statute, but the Washington cour.
added an additional element.

"A person injured by

a defective

product simply cannot be said to have discovered the cause el
injury in a legally enforceable sense until he or she discovers
who

manufactured

or

supplied

responsible for the injury."
that

it

statutory

conceivably
two

years

manufacturer.

could
to

the

product

(page 764).
require

learn

the

or

is

otherwise

The plaintiff argues

several
name

of

years

beyond the

the

responsible

It is almost like saying the statutory two years

is meaningless.
This Court believes that under the new Utah statute if the
plaintiff commenced the suit within two years, he would have had
a "reasonable" time to discover the name of the manufacturer and
make him a party to the action.

In actual fact, the plaintiff

did not file this suit until May 11, 1990, four years and five
months

after

the

injury.

That

time

frame

is not within the

spirit of either the old law or the new law.
The motion to set aside the granting of summary judgment in
favor of Casa Herrera is denied.
Defendant, Casa Herrera is directed to draw a formal order
based on this ruling.
Dated October 23, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

Judg^7

APPENDIX F
November 1 3 , 1991 O r d e r

r1" '"'; * •: - _.: ? j
Jay E. Jensen, #167 6
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Casa Herrera
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES M. ARAGON,

;
;I

Plaintiff,
V •

J

CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, BORDEN, INC.,
a New Jersey corporation,
CASA HERRERA, INC., a California
corporation, and JOHN DOES
I through X, inclusive,

j
]
)
•

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Civil No. 900747717 PI
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions
for summary judgment and plaintiff's objection and motion for nev
trial or to alter or amend judgment.
A hearing on defendants' motions for summary judgment
was held on July 23, 1991.

Plaintiff was represented by Douglas

M. Durbano, Esq. and Paul Johnson, Esq. Borden and Clover Clul
were represented by Allan T. Brinkerhoff and Steven W. Call Esq,
Casa Herrera was represented by M. Douglas Bayly, Esq.
The Court, having considered the matter fully, signec
and entered a Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment dated Jul}
31, 1991, granting both motions, which was served on counsel foi

1

0055581

FILMED

the parties by mail on August 2, 1991.

Counsel for defendants

Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc. prepared and served a
proposed Order and Judgment on August 6, 1991.
The plaintiff

subsequently

filed

an objection to the

proposed order and a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the
judgment as to the Court's ruling on Casa Herrera's motion.
Court

heard

arguments

October 22, 1991.

on

plaintiff's

objection

and

motion

The
on

Douglas M. Durbano, Esq. appeared on behalf of

the plaintiff, and M. Douglas Bayly, Esq. appeared on behalf of
defendant Casa Herrera.

The Court, having considered plaintiff's

arguments, signed and entered a Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration dated October 23, 1991 denying plaintiff's motion.
With

good

cause

now

appearing, the Court enters the

following judgment and order pursuant to Rule 58A(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

entered

in

favor of

defendants Borden, Inc. and Clover Club Foods Company and against
plaintiff

James

M.

Aragon

for the

reasons

set

forth

in this

Court's Ruling dated July 31, 1991.
2.

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

entered

in

favor of

defendant Casa Herrera, Inc. and against plaintiff James M. Aragon
for the reasons set forth in this Court's Ruling dated July 31,
1991.

2

3.

Plaintiff's

Objection

to

Proposed

Order

and

Judgment and Motion for a New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment
is hereby denied for the reasons set forth in this Court's Ruling
dated October 23, 1991.
4.

The action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

DATED AND ENTERED this

/3

day of S/'f"n/-'r-

1991.

BY THECOURT:

r^//

^_

Dougla«--I^r Cornaby
District Judge

0055583

APPENDIX G
Notice of Appeal dated November 13, 1991

DEO IS 1391

Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
Paul H. Johnson (#4856)
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES M. ARAGON,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA,
INC., a California Corporation,
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive,

Civil No. 900747717PI
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff in the above entitled
matter, James M. Aragon, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah from the Order and Judgment granting Summary
Judgment to Defendants Clover Club Foods Company, Borden, Inc.,
and Casa Herrerra, Inc., and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with
prejudice, entered in this action on November 13, 1991, by the
Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of Utah.
DATED this 1L-

day of December, 1991.
DURB.

& ASSOCIATES

'/&

Douglas M^tDurbano
Paul H. Jphnson
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the following:

Jay E. Jensen, Esq.
M. Douglas Bayly, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Defendant
Casa Herrerra, Inc.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101
Allan T. Brinkerhoff, Esq.
Steven W. Call, Esq.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
Attorneys for Defendants Clover Club
Foods Company and Borden, Inc.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101

l2t day of December, 1991

postage pre-paid on this //>

(l\pldgs\870570.)

APPENDIX H
October 5, 1989 Letter

D O U G L A S M. D U R B A N O
A T T O R N E Y A T LAW

BUSH A

UNITED SAVINGS PLAZA
4185 HARRISON BOULEVARD • SUITE 320
OGDEN. UTAH 84403
TELEPHONE (801) 621-4111

October 5/ 1989

-CERTIFIED MAILBorden, Inc. and/or
Clover Club Poods Company
C/0 Prentice Hall Corporate Systems
Registered Coroorate Agent
185 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:
My Pile:

•<?L

*3
1*

James Aragon
87-0570

NOTICE OP INTENT TO COMMENCE PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTION
To Whom It May Concern:
Please let this letter serve as formal notice, pursuant to
the Utah Products Liability Act, U.C.A. Section 78-15-1/ et seg.,
that James M. Aragon intends to commence a oroducts liability
action against the designers, manufacturers, owners and/or
operators of a certain dough-mixing machine, which caused him
personal injury while employed by Clover Club Foods Company,
Kaysville, Utah, on or about December 16, 1985.
The general nature of the claim is that on the above date,
while in the course of his employment, James M. Aragon was
operating for the first time the dough-mixing machine from which
taco shells were made. Mr. Aragon had been working for Clover
Club Poods only since December 3, 1985, and had received no
instructions about the operation or cleaning of the dough-mixing
machine. At approximately 4:15 p.m., he shut the, machine off,
but was then instructed by his supervisor to plug the machine
back in and to clean it. Aragon turned the machine on, letting
it operate for a few minutes. Then, he walked up the three steps
next to the machine to look in the top of the machine to see if
the dough was churned out of it. While ascending these steps he
slipped on some grease covering the steps. He grabbed hold of
the edge of the dough-mixing machine in an attempt to steady
himself, whereupon the paddle at the top of the machine, which
pushed dough down into the auger at the bottom of the machine,
swept his left, hand and arm into the machine. It took paramedics
approximately one hour to free Mr. Aragon1s arm and hand from the
machine.
As a result of the accident, Mr. Aragon sustained to his
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left arm and hand significant damage, open fractures of the
radius and ulna bones, and nerve damage to the ulnar nerve.
Although there has been some improvement following several
surgeries and almost 4 years of recovery/ Mr. Aragon continues to
have a permanent partial disability and impairment based upon
loss of function and range of motion in his upper extremity, his
left arm and hand, equivalent to 41%. The 41% impairment to such
upper extremity translates to a 25% impairment to the whole
person.
With the cooperation of Clover Club Foods Company and
Borden, Inc. in obtaining information about the dough-mixing
machine involved in this accident, it is possible that neither
Clover Club nor Borden would suffer any liability. Without such
cooperation, however, both Clover Club and Borden would need to
be named as co-defendants. Therefore, I would hope you would
cooperate with us in obtaining this information, to everyone's
mutual benefit. If you have any questions or comments regarding
this matter, please have your legal counsel, insurance company or
other representative contact me as soon as possible.
This Notice is given this

ber, 1989.

DOUGLAS
Attorne
DMD/nac

DORBANO
or James M« Aragon

APPENDIX I
Affidavit of Paul Johnson

'-e i i m
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
Paul H. Johnson (#4856)
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

JAMES M. ARAGON,
Plaintiff,
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
PAUL H. JOHNSON

vs.
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New
:
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA,
INC., a California Corporation,
:
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive,
:
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

H.

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

)
)SS
)

COUNTY OF WEBER
Paul

Civil No. 900747717PI

Johnson, being

first duly sworn upon his oath

deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 21 and competent to be a witness

herein, and as attorney for the Plaintiff in this matter, I am
personally familiar with this matter, and all statements made
herein are made upon personal knowledge, unless otherwise stated
that such statement is upon information and belief.

2.

On October 6, 1989, the Plaintiff sent a Notice of Intent

to Commence Product Liability Action to Borden, Inc. (hereinafter
" Borden") and Clover Club Foods Company
Club").

(hereinafter

"Clover

A copy of such Notice of Intent to Commence Product

Liability Action is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

In such

Notice, the Plaintiff requested information from Clover Club or
Borden concerning the manufacturer of the masa feeder machine.
Plaintiff stated in such notice that if Borden and Clover Club
cooperated with the Plaintiff in ascertaining the manufacturer of
the subject masa feeder machine, the Plaintiff would be inclined
to refrain from naming either Clover Club or Borden as a party to
the action.
5.

Because Clover Club and Borden did not cooperate

with the Plaintiff in providing the Plaintiff with the name of the
manufacturer of the subject masa feeder machine, on November 10,
1989, the Plaintiff

filed a Complaint for Damages in Federal

District Court for the Northern District of Utah.

Such complaint

listed Clover Club, Borden and John Does I through X as party
defendants.

It was recognized by both parties that the Federal

District Court would have diversity jurisdiction in this case, if
the parties could agree to dismiss Clover Club from the action.
Because the parties could not agree to dismiss Clover Club, and
pursuant to motion by Clover Club and Borden, the Complaint in
the Federal District Court was dismissed for lack of diversity
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jurisdiction on April 20, 1990.

On May 11, 1990, the Plaintiff

refiled his Complaint in the Second District Court, in and for
Davis County, State of Utah, naming the same party defendants.
6.

Plaintiff originally served his First Set of Discovery

on Clover Club and Borden on January 11, 1990, in the Federal
District Court case.

Although the Defendants, Borden and Clover

Club, originally agreed to informally answer Plaintiff's discovery
in the Federal case, they did not follow through on such promise.
Following

the

dismissal

of

the

Federal

case

for

lack of

jurisdiction and the refiling of Plaintiff's Complaint in State
Court, Plaintiff again served Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery
requests on Borden and Clover Club.

Finally, on July 13, 1990,

Clover Club's and Borden's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of
Discovery

were

received

by

Plaintiff. In such Answers, the

Defendants identified the manufacturer of the subject masa feeder
machine as Casa Herrerra, Inc. of 5860 South Mettler Street, Los
Angeles, California.
7.

On August 14, 1990, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

name and join Casa Herrerra to the action as one of the "John Doe"
defendants.

On October 16, 1990, the Order granting leave to join
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Casa Herrerra to the action as a party defendant was entered.

On

November 8, 1990, Casa Herrerra was served with a Summons and
Complaint in this matter.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

day of August, 1991.

<Ui^n~
Paul H. Johnson

A

Sv/orn tor and subscribed before me this

U&T

A9" w day of

. 1991.

Public

Residing in: OfldtA
, .
My Commission Expires'-~&fcfo

NOTARY 1'UBLIC
JANETTE SNYDER
3340 MMTlton Blvd. »20O
Ofld«fl.Uun M*<»

BTATE OP UTAH,
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